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Between the wars , and indeed at any time , the relationship between
government and industry is an immen sely comp lex issue. The conclu-
sions of thi s essay can therefore only be tentative, and must be confined
to a single aspect of gove rnment-industry relations. Nevertheless , most
communication between government and business was handled by civil
servants, and the method s emplo yed , and assumptions made, by civ il
servants are therefore an essential concern of economic and political
histor ians. T his essay has suggested that , during a period when the
relationship between industry and government was rapidly changing, a
particular form of relat ionship emerged as a con seq uence of stro ngly
held opinions within the civil service . Officials did not wish entirely to
prevent change in the relationship between government and industry;
but the method to whic h their assumptions about the proper role of
government led the m did limit the extent to which change could take
place . Protection of the proper role of Parl iament, and the constant
avoidance ofoverl officia l manipulation of industrial decisions, ensured
tha t no comprehensive industrial polic y emerged in the 1930S. In stead
the period saw a series of unco-ordinated and ad hoc policies to help
individual industrie s suc h as coa l, cotton and shipping . Officials in the
1930S were often cr iticised by contemporary businessme n for bei ng
inefficie nt. Some politicians, especially Mosley, saw them as reaction-
ary. H istorians may take the more balanced , and as it happens more
charitab le, view that the underl ying philosop hy of government action
was in turmoil between the wars, and that officia ls were afflicted by a
sincere and conscientious doubt about their own proper role; within the
guide lines they set themselves they ach ieved much , but not eno ugh
either to escape criticism or do more than touch the surface of the
problems of British ind ustry in the 1930S.
7 · Financiers, The Gold Standard and
British Politics, 1925-1931
Philip Williamson
Intere st in the inter-war Briti sh gold standard has naturally con-
centrated on its monetary and broader economic aspects. Studies by
Clay, Sayers, Clarke, Moggridge and Howson have pro vided excellent
accounts of the economic discussions that preceded the return to the
gold standard in 1925, of the difficulties encountered by the Bank of
England in maintaining it, of its repercussions upon British trade,
industry and employment, and of the Bank's ultimately un successful
attempts to defend it during the 1931 crisis . ' Yet the return to the gold
standa rd also had important political implications, whic h have been
noted or discussed in passing but not systematically examined.2
Being on the gold standard meant that monetary policy was technic-
ally 'outside politics' , under the control nOI of the government but of a
private , self-appointed company, the Bank of England. With the out-
break of war in 1914, however, the Govern me nt was called upon by the
Bank of England to help deal with the consequences of a European
liquidity crisis . As a result , the Treasury began issuing its own currency
notes, and as the war progressed and the country's financial position
de terio rated, the gold stan dard was in practice set aside and the
Treasury increasingly became invo lved in other parts of the Bank's
traditional functions , particularly exchange control and debt manage-
ment. Wit h the forma l suspension of the gold standard in April 1919,
the T reasury became the predominant monetary authority. This sus-
pension was, however, forced upon the government ; official com-
mittees had already , in 1918, advised that an effective gold standard
should be restored, and from 1919 this became the policy of successive
government s. Decontrol was as much an official objective in monetary
affairs as it was in industrial policy, and received still less discussion,
even du rin g the parl iamentary debate s on the return to gold in 1925.
Politicians of all part ies accepted the gold standard on conventional
economic grounds - a belief that British prosperity was dependent
upon re-establishing the country's position within the international
economy. Churchill, the Conservative Chancellor of the Exchequer
responsible for the ultim ate decision to resume gold payments,
required rather more convincing than most; but Snowden, the Labour
party's financial spokesman, publicly supported the gold standard in
'.
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principle, and had to be pressed by a party co mmittee to criticise even
the timing of the deci sion' - an objection so mild th at it was indis-
tin guishabl e fro m tha t of some City advocates of the gold standard . The
question of political cont rol barely arose; even of those very few ,\1Ps
who opposed the decision outright , only two members of the Indepen-
dent Labour Party complained abo ut credit policy bein g in the hands of
priva te bankers.' T he effect of the return to gold , indeed , was that the
Treasury officials and their political superiors had on ly limited influ-
ence over a vital determinant of domestic economic performan ce; that
mini sters rarely , if ever, needed to think about currency and excha nge
question s, and that consequent ly when the Bank of England asked
again for government assistance , in 193 1, some were int imidated and
disadvantaged by inadequate know ledge .' T his posit ion is notoriously
exp ressed in the reported statement of a former Labour cabinet minis-
ter when the gold standard was suspended in Sep tember 1931: 't hey
never to ld us we could do that'. ' The first part of what follows examines
bank ing and T reasury thinking abo ut the gold standard and the rela-
tionship betwee n monetary policy and pol itics, in order to explain how
such a situation developed .
It has been argued that the Bank of England represented the
'extreme ly narrow section ofoverseas finance' rather than City financial
interests generally , and furt her that the gold standard policy was pro-
moted essent ially for the advantage of that particu lar section rat her
than out of concern for ind ustry and trade." Obviously there were
diffe rences between the specific interests of merchant bankers, di s-
count houses, clearing banks , finance companies and insurance firms,
but there was in fact no significant difference between these gro ups
over the gold standard, either in 1925 or 1931. Moreove r , City finan -
ciers regarded the gold standard as estab lishing the essential framewo rk
for a sound and permanent revival of trade and indu stry. They did not
forget t hat ultimately the City' s prosperity was dependent upon
Britain's indu strial strength, and whatever the earlier differences
between financiers and industrialists over the advisability of returning
to gold , with th e onset of deep depression from 1929 most of them cam e
to adopt similar posi tions on the issues of Empire trade, import restric-
tions, taxation and economy .
Much has been written in general about the polit ical role of the City
between the war s, but apart from Moggridge's examination of the
return to gold, little attempt has been made to substantiate the se claims
by detailed stud ies. The second part of this essay suggests how such a
study might proceed on the gold standard period itself, and particula rly
on its final two years - when the division between 'bank ing' and
'politics' was gradually broken dow n.
In April 1925 Layton, editor of The Economist , wrote that he had
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been ' amazed at the doubts and hesitat ions which have been current in
the City of London for the last three months about the gold standard'. '
These misgivings were evident in the annual speeches of the chairmen
of the clearing banks in January, and were even expressed privately
within the Bank of England . The uncertainty was essentially about
timing: it was feared that a premature return to parity , before rising
American prices had reached British levels, would involve a risk of
being forced back off the gold standard , and might require such a high
bank rate as protection for the gold reserve s that industry would be
hampered . However, of the lead ing City bankers only McKenna,
chairman of the Midland Bank , took dis like of the possibility of defla-
tion to the point of joining Keynes in opposing any return to the gold
standard - thou gh not in public .' All ot her lead ing financiers regarded
an eventual return to gold at the pre-war parity as essential , and even
McKenna ultimately admitted that for psychological and political
reasons an early ret urn was inescapable." And once gold parity had
been restored in late April, it was un iver sally accepted in the City that
abandonment would destroy British credit, and therefore could not be
contemplated.
Treasury officials were as com mitted as City bankers to the gold
standard , because it was believed to be of great benefit to the count ry as
a whole, and no t merely a means of strengthening London's financial
interests. A fixed currency and stable excha nges were considered essen-
tia l conditions for a permanent revival of trade, industry and employ-
ment; and the City's invisible earn ings helped to pay for imports,
produced a balance of payments surplus, and so genera ted capital for
the foreign investme nt which stimulated demand for Br itish exports.
T he intere sts of finance , trade and ind ustry were therefore regarded as
inte rdepen dent, and if merchants and man ufacturers were less enthu-
siastic than bankers abo ut the ret urn to gold , it was thought that this
was simply because they tended to takea shorterview.11 Moreover, the
gold standard was also considered to be of general benefit because it
served as a ' thermometer measuring the economic activity of a
country' ;" it provided a warning against trade imbalances , and even
more importantly, acted as a check against an undue expansion of
credit. The 'spectre of inflation' haunted bankers and Treasury
officials, especially after the finan cial and economic excesses which had
followed the suspension of gold payments in 1919, and after the con-
tinental hyperinflations of the early 1920S had left 'debris scattered all
over Europe' . It was believed that unless inflation were checked, it
would inexorably dislocate all economic relationships, provoke indus-
trial unrest , and lead to political di sorder. So great was this fear of
inflation and its insidio us ways that any alternative to having the
currency tied to gold was regarded as impracticable and dangerous;
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behind every exponent of a 'managed currency' there was thought to
lurkan inflationist. 13 However, the greatest threat to currency stability
wasconsidered to come not from such economist and banking critics as
Keynes and McKenna, but rather from the politicians. Owing to the
political temptations of financial and monetary manipulation , politi-
cians of all parties had to be regarded as potentially suspect. Con-
servative and Liberal min isters in the Coalition government had been
respon sible for the inflationary developm ent s of 19t9, and during the
1920 5 there seemed to be a particular threat from some sections of the
Labour party. For ban kers and T reasury officials, therefore, by no
mean s the least advant age of the return to the gold standard was th at it
was believed to take monetary policy out of polit ics.
Great emphasis was laid upon the theory tha t under the gold standard
adju stments were 'automatic'. According to Bradbury - a member of all
the post-war committees that recommended a return to the gold stan-
dard - this meant that it was 'knave-proof. It could not be rigged for
political or even more unworthy reasons. '101 Moreover) it was also
regarded as an important reinforcement for th at other check upon
political manipulation of th e financial system, the 'balanced budget
convention' . IS Even McKenna stressed this point: ' the fear of being
forced off the gold standard acts as a salutary check on the extravagance
of Governments'.16 However , insistence upon the automatic operation
of the gold standard alone was not considered sufficient ; in order to
guarantee that its rules were properl y applied, it was thought necessar y
that authority in monetary policy should rest exclusively with the Bank
~ of England , as this was conventionally regarded as a non-political
institution .
The Bank of England was in fact a private corpo ration, and some
aspects of its composition and work meant th at it provided leadership
for all the other pr ivate financial institutions of the City. Apart from the
Governor and D eput y Gove rnor, the most influential members of the
Court of Directors and its Committee of Treasury - the 'Inner Cabinet
of the Bank' - were usually partners or directors in mercha nt ban ks,
acceptance houses and overseas banks, although the Court did also
include shipo wners and mer chant s, with a sprinkling later in the 1920S
of indu striali sts, ex-civil servants and former Bank officials . Directors
of British clearing ban ks were traditionall y excluded from the Court,
but in fulfilling the Bank of England's function as the 'bank of the
bankers' and superintendent of th e finan cial system generally, the
Governor met at least once a week with representatives of the Corn-
mi ttee of Clearing Bankers, as well as with those of the Discount
Market Committee and th e Stock Exchange Committee. Norman
established regular contact with chairmen and other members of many
individual banks and financ e houses, and succes sfully encouraged the
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prac tice by which 'any rep uta ble person in the City [was] at libert y to
see him'.17
Howeve r, Nor man also placed the highest emp hasis upon the Bank
of England 's public respon sibilities. So on the one hand , the Bank
sought to maintain a position of independence within the City and tried
to discipline other financial institutions whe n their activities seemed
undes irable from the standpoint of the country's financial welfare;" on
the other hand , the Bank adhered strongly to the doctrine that its
functions also required it to have political independence. T his doctrine
was best stated by No rman's de puty, Harvey, to t he Macmillan Com-
mittee in late t9 29: because the Bank of England' s main du ty was
to conduct its operations in the interests of the community as a whole, .. . we
. . . have always considered that it should be free from the control of particular
groups and interests For the same reason I think I may claim that it is an
accepted principle that it should be free from being required to submit to
political pressure and to subordinate sound finance to the dictates of political
expediency.
T he Bank necessarily had close relations with the Treasury, but accord-
ing to Harvey the se were ' fundament ally those of banker and client' ,
and the T reasury did 'not seek to dictate any alternative line of financial
policy if [the Bank] . .. consider a part icular line of policy essential for
the protection of the country's main reserves' ." Fo r N orman and the
Bank such polit ical freedom was, indeed , a general principle of central
banking, as was shown in their international activities. Partly under
British influence, the international economic conferences at Brussels in
1920 and Genoa in t922 propounded this principle , while the Bank
dem anded its adoption when assisting in the monetar y reconstruct ion
of European countries, and when fostering central bank s in the
Dominions and in Latin America." Where central bank s were estab-
lished abroad, Norman insisted upon dealing directly with them , not
with foreign governments nor eve n through Briti sh government agen-
cies;" with his encouragem ent, the leadin g central banks therefore
conducted their own financial diplomacy. No rman also took consider-
able pains to ensure that the Bank for International Settlements,
established under the Young Plan in 1930 to deal with reparat ion
payments and promote central bank co-operation , should be 'b eyond
the reach of Governments';"
In the domestic marke t political independence was regarded as
extend ing to all aspects of monetary policy. T he return to the gold
standard restored to the Bank of England , and to the Governor in
particular , control over bank rate , credi t supply and - after monetary
stabilisation had been completed by the 1928 Cur rency and Bank Notes
Act - over note issue. T his control was approved in principle by almost
all other interested parties, even by Keynes and the 'business world',
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des pite their criticisms of the Bank's specific policies." Hopkins,
Controller of Fin ance at the Treasur y, affirmed that ' the contro l of our
cu rrency is exclusively a matter for the Bank of Eng land . It is not a
matter in which the Government int ervenes.? " Even most politicians
upheld the princi ple of the Bank ' s independence from their contro l -
largely, it seems, out of suspicion of each other 's motives. So both
Churc hill, as Conservative Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1924 to
1929, and Sno wden, his Labour successor from 1929 to 1931, asserted
that their governments had no responsibility or influence in the deter-
min ation of bank rate." Officially the Labour party (and the TUC)
were comm itted to the ultim ate nationalisat ion of the Bank of England,
but even so th eir leaders, above all Snowden, insisted that control
should cont inue to be withheld from politician s, and should pass
instead to a non-political public corporanon."
As the corollaryof its own freedom from political pressures, the Bank
of England maintained the principle that it did not interve ne in politics.
H arvey told the Macmillan Committee that
we never venture to interfereon any question thatcan be considered a political
question, unless we are asked to express an opinion as to what the financial
effect ofacertainpoliticaloperation may be. If we areasked, we giveouradvice,
but we never seek to interfere in politics.
Accordingly , Harvey declared , 'the colour of the Govern ment of the
moment hard ] absolutely no influence whatever' on the nature of the
Bank's relati ons with the Chancellor of the Exchequer." In compliance
with thi s principle of non-intervention , the Bank imposed a number of
checks upon itself. In order not to embarrass the Treasur y, the Bank
wou ld only have contacts with ot her government departments with its
knowledge and approval. No rman asserted that there was an unwritten
ru le that Bank of Eng land directors should not publicly express views
.on financial matters differing from tho se of the current Chancellor of
the Exchequer. There was also a trad ition th at no Bank dire ctor should
be an MP , except for the City of Lond on, whose Members were
expected to preserve more independence from their politi cal parties
th an most other MP s." The position of the Bank director City MP
throughout the inter-war gold standa rd period was ind eed unique - for
Edwa rd Grenfell, of the merchant bank Morgan , Grenfell & Co, was
also a partner of the leading New York internat ional bankers, J .P.
Mor gan & Co, the Brit ish govern ment 's financi al agent s in the United
Stat es. In th is capacity Grenfell helped arr ange American cred its for the
Government both when th e gold standard was restored in 1925, and
when it was being defended in 1931." From several directions, there-
fore, Grenfell felt public responsibi lities transcending his mem bersh ip
of the Conservative part y. He part icularly claimed that because of its
)
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nationalservices, the City as awhole occupied a special position, telling
the House of Com mons in February t930 that ' the City ... is not
political in any sense' , and tha t City MPs had always maint ained that
they were 'freer than any other Member to exp ress [ their] opinions on
any subject and in favour of either side' ."?
Formally, then, there was a clear division between the concerns of
the Bank of England and those of the government and politicians. As
No rma n told Snowden in September 1929: ' his was the technical and
financial side - the Chancellor's was the polit ical and fiscal side' ."
Of course, the real position was not so clear cut. Although the gold
standard itself was not in que stion , th ere could be di fferen ces between
the government and the Bank of England on subo rdi nate monetary
measures and other financial issues, resulting in encroachments by
both sides. Even in central banking doctrine, the government's banker
had an ultim ate duty to the community to use every possible means to
prevent its client from destroying its own cred it - an obligation which
would inevitably draw the cent ral bank directly into political qu est ions.
For example, in the early 1920S Norman advised his counterpart at the
Reichsbank to 'make a practice of ob jecting to any unwi se economic
measures or to any inflationary policy which your Government may
wish to ado pt. It matte rs not whether such policy may seem unavoid-
able or not.''' T he Bank of England itself had during its immediate
post-war struggle to regain monetary cont rol pressed the British
government to cease borrowing , reduce expenditure, and balance the
budget." Even after sound finance and the formal division of respon-
sibilities had been restored , however, the Bank and the government
still continued in practice to exert influence in each other's fields,
particularly as the conduct of government financial busine ss required
con stant communication between them. In the Governor's at least
twice -weekly visits to the T reasury, his 'fa irly frequent' calls upon the
Chancellor of the Exchequer, and his contacts with various other
govern ment departments, he natu rally affected political decision-
making even while simply reporting conditions in the City or advising
on financial aspects of specific policies." Conversely, such communica-
tions gave the Chancellor and T reasury officials oppo rt uni ties to apply
informal pressure upon the Bank - and despite their public statements
both Churc hill and Snowden did protest strongly in private against
increases in bank rate."
To some degree, therefore, the formal distinction between banking
and politics was a facade maintained by both sides in order to protect
the Bank from dangerous demands foreven more ministerial interven-
tion, and ministers from public responsibility for unpleasant policies.
Neve rt heless, unt il 1929 this demarcation was on the whole observed ,
and apart from intermittent out bursts by Churchill about credit policy
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. no serious diffe rences arose between the government and either the
Bank of England or the City generally. One obvious reason for this was
that the Govern ment was Conservative , with policies broadly congenial
to the City. Its finan cial policy was ultimately 'so und' - though some of
Churchill's unconventional meth ods of obtaining a budget balance
caused Norman to liken him to a juggler." The Conservative party's
abando nment of a general tariff policy in t924, and the government 's
cautious use of the Safeguarding of Industr ies legislation , reduced the
possibility of conflict with the City 's tradi tional commitment to free
trade . The re was no friction when a European and American plea
for 'economic freedom' was signed in October t926 by Nor man,
Goodenough , chairman of Barcla ys Bank , McK enna, Beaum ont Pease
(chairman) and Bell (a direc tor) of Lloyds Bank , Schuster of the
National Provincial Bank , Currie ofGlyn , Mill s & Co, Bradbury (now a
di rector of William Deacons Bank), Holland-Martin , secretary of the
Bankers' Clearing House , and other leadin g Briti sh bankers , business-
men and industrialists."
A furt her reason for this relativel y tro uble-free relati onship was the
Bank of England 's avoidance of increases in bank rate between Decem-
ber 1925 and February 1929, despi te the fact thai sterling was
repeatedly under strain. Churchill's threats when bank rat e was raised
du ring t925 , and his occasional bitt er complaints against wha t he
considered to be the Bank's policy of 'deflation ' ," may have had some
influence upon the Bank's decisions. Howeve r, T reasury officials sup-
ported the Bank, while Churc hill - lacking th e technical understanding
to prevail against both of these - always backed down , and it seems
dou btful that fear of his bluster would have made the Bank hesitate for
long if it had considered increases in bank rate rea lly appropriate . In the
Bank's view ) the strains upon sterling were caused not so much by
domestic weaknesses requiring treatment by means of changes in bank
rate, as by external pressures arising from the various post-war distor-
tions of the international financial system - Norman complained about
'how greatly the international machine is out of gear'.3 9 Believing these
strains to be extraneous and temporary, the Bank considered that
British industry and trade should be protected from their conse-
quences, and so devel oped expedients to defend sterling without
increasing bank rate." Although the pound remained based upon a
gold standard and the Bank still hoped to return to an 'automatic'
system, sterling hadin practicebecome, in Norman's words, '3 more or
less managed Currency'.41
However, this management was not intended to insulate the domes-
tic economy against 'real' forces of world competition in product ion ,
nor against permanent changes in the international financial system;
after all, the gold standard was supposed to provide the framework for
,
,
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proper ad justment to such conditions. After 1925 the Bank pursued
what it regarded as a neutral internal monetary policy, maintaining a
roughly stable volume of credit and whenever possible keeping bank
rate at a level which in its view 'inflicted no hardship on trade' ." So
although Norman and others at the Bank later ad mitted tha t the return
to gold had exacerbated the difficulties of industr y, they did not accep t
that the monetary system was responsible for indu stri al depression and
unemployment ." Rather , they believed that since t 918 British
industry and tr ade had suffered from the ' bru te facts' of post-war
depression , the consequences of 'general currency chaos' , and 't rernen-
dous changes' in industr ial technology. Compared to such disruptions,
any deleterious effects of the return to gold were minor - and even these
had been great ly aggravated by a series of subseq uent ' mischances',
particularly the und ervaluations of the French and Belgian curre ncies.
In the Bank's view, Brit ish industr y would in any event have had to
make considerable readj ustments, and its main problem was that thi s
process had become 'jammed' , partly because of 'stickiness in respect
of wages' but mostly because of a genera l failure to reduce costs,
improve methods and switch to more profitable lines of production. "
Fo r these reasons, and also because [he condition of industry ultimately
affected the position of sterling, Norman became from 1928 an enthu-
siastic supporter of ' rationalisation' of the basic industries.
These views on the relatio nship between monetary policy and indus-
try were shared by most other City bankers. McKenna, howe ver,
emphasised monetary factors as a cause of indu stri al depression and
unem ployment . In Ja nuary 1926 he argued that an 'ove r-valuation' of
sterling had ' seriously impaired our expo rt trade' , and although he
thought this ' impediment ' was 'fa st disappearing' , a year later he
comp lained that the 'rigidity of the Bank of England system' was such
that there was an insufficient supply of credit available to allow for any
sign ificant trade expansion . Accord ingly, he called for an 'ex haustive
inquiry' into the credit and currency system ." By 1928 these and
similar criticisms by Keyne s, by prominent businessmen , and by
leaders of the T UC , were influencing opposition polit icians whose
interest in these issues was stimulated by the continuing high level of
unemployment , and by the debates surrounding the Currency and
Bank Notes Bill. Abandonment of the gold standard was not proposed ,
but both the report of the Liberal Industr y Inquiry, Britain 's Industrial
Future , and the Labour party's Labour and the Nation advocated
changes in the conduct of monetary policy and took up the call for a
banking inquiry." However, it was not until the following year th at the
Bank was subjected to such an inquiry .
Ind eed , during 1929 the relati onship between banking and politics
began to change generally. There were three reasons for thi s: cr iticism
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of increases in bank rate in February and September, the appointment
of a Labour government in Jun e, and the onset of the world depression
from October .
The difficulties over bank rate arose because of the attr action of
capital from Europe to New York by the Wall Street stock market
boom, which threatened to force sterling off the gold standard. During
late t928 and early 1929 the Bank tried all its expedients for avoiding a
curta ilment of credit and rise in bank rate, but as the position still
deteriorated it felt obliged on 7 February to resort to a rate increase of
t% to 51%." Churchill again protested to the Bank, and this time even
raised the matter in Cabinet on the ground that the increase 'would have
a chilling effect on trade revival' . In the event , it was emphasised in
Cabinet that the Governm ent had 'no responsibility for the movement
of the Bank Rate and does not control the policy of the Bank of
England' , and Churchill followed suit in parliamentary statement s;"
but the Bank had been reminded again of the political sensitivity of
bank rate increases, while criticism of credit policy among producer
groups and opposition polit icians inevitably increased . Bankers'
explanations, such as that of Grenfell in Parliament, that the decision
was 'no reflection upon British bankers' because it was 'forced on them'
by 'gambling in America', had little influence." In such circumstances,
Government denials of responsibility which had previously strength-
ened the Bank , now had the potentially dangerous consequence of
isolating it. The Bank of England therefore found itself in a difficult
position in the early summer when increased pressures upon sterling
were followed by the election of a Labour government .
Although credit policy was not an issue at the general election, the
Labour party was pledged to hold an inquiry into the banking system,
and the Bank of England felt that it had to be very careful if it were to
avoid interference from the new Government , or agitation for early
nat ionalisation. Although Norman and other bankers knew that the
new Chancellor, Snowden, had 'always been quite sound on the gold
standard?" and on financial policy generally - more so than Churchill-
and that he could be relied upon to resist extreme demands against the
Bank, Snowden had , on the other hand, spoken of ' reforming' mone-
tary policy, he was more certain of his own judgement in financial
matters than was Churchill, and if at all possible the Bank did not wish
to embarrass him in his relations with its more threatening Labour
critics." While Snowden proceeded slowly, gave private assurances to
the Bank, and announced in Parliament in July that he had 'no inten-
tion of calling [the gold standard) in que stion' , he nevertheless began
preparations for an inquiry 'into possible improvements in ourexisting
system of banking and credit' ." Later that mont h, he also publicly told
Bank directors and other leading City bankers that he hoped there
)
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would be no further increase in bank rate - something Churchill had
neve r done."
Politicalconsiderations were therefore the main reason why the Bank
tried to avoid a rise in bank rate during July t929 - and its position
became still more difficult during August. Heavy gold losses and a rise
in New York rates seemed to require an immediate increase in London
rates, and in addi tion the political cont roversies and financial distur-
bances associated with the Hague Conference on reparations caused
Norman and senior Bank directors to fear a crisis similar to that which
was to arise in 1931 . However, since an increasein bank rate during the '
conference would cause difficult ies for Snowden, Norman again
employed other expedients, and obtained American assistance." On
the other hand , the financial dangers of a breakdown in the conference
due to Snowden's insistence on British claims seemed so great that in
mid-August Norman feld compelled to intervene in what was strictly a
government matter. He and Lamont , an American member of the
Young Committee and a part ner in J.P. Morgan & Co, interrupted
MacDonald's holiday in Scotland in order to persuade him to caution
Snowden ." Despite this warning, Snowden successfully maintained
his stand, the Hague Conference reached a sett lement, and the threat of
a German crisis subsided. But the Americanpressures remained, and in
early September Snowden again tried to dissuade Norman from raising
bank rate, arguing that it 'would harm trade' and be 'bitterly crit icised'.
In the end, however , he yielded to the arguments of Norman," who at
last felt able to increase the rate to 6)% on 26 September .
Snowden was right abour the criticism," which was particularly
embarrassing for him in a week preceding the Labour partyconference;
party calls for a banking inquiry could now 'ha rdly be resisted' ,"
Despite Nor man' s plea that 'the mere promise of such a Committee
would of itself endanger our financial position', and might even
threaten the maintenance of the gold standard, Snowden announced
during his speech to the party conference on 3 October that one would
indeed be appointed soon, though with Norman's warning in mind he
also defended the bank rate increase and said that his own decision did
'norarise ourof recent events') nor imply any 'reflection whateverupon
British banking and financial institutions'.~9 As Snowden remained
attentive to the Bank's interests, Norman's influence was shown in the
appointment as members of the committee of Bradbury, a gold stan-
dard pur ist , F rater Taylor , one of the Bank 's industrial advisers, and
Lubbock, a member of its Committee of Treasury, who was especially
vigilant as the Bank's watchdog on the inquiry committee." Brand, a
director of Lazard Bros & Co, agreed to serve because he felt it ' very
import ant to British financial inte rests that the Committee's report
should be sound as there are a great many anti-City element s in the
" .
,.
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Labour Party' ." However , Snowden naturally felt obliged to pro vide
proper balance in the committee's membership , with result s which
worried even his Treasury secretary, who thoug ht there was a 'danger
of giving the impression that the Governor is being put on trial' , since
the comm ittee was to include 'three of his bitterest critics (McKenna,
Keynes and Bevin )' of whom , it was claimed , McKenna was 'known to
havepursued an intense vendetta against him foryears'. 6 2 Certainly the
appo intment as chairman of a judge, H .P . Macmillan , who later
admitted to being mystified by finance, " did nothing to prevent the se
three - especially Keynes - from dominating the committee's proceed-
ings.
The cha nge of government also affected th e att itude of the Bank and
the City generally towards industria l rationalisation. Among Norman' s
original reasons for assisting armaments, iron and steel , and cotton
firms was a desire 'to keep the question away from politics', and for
political and financial reasons the Conservative government had wel-
comed the Bank 's involvement. Both were well aware that diffic ultie s
in key industries could excite Labour demands for natio nalisation; so
the Bank , assisted by some clearing banks and merc hant bankers,
promoted rationalisation as an alternative. " However, contrary to the
Bank's fears, th e Labour government actually welcomed its rat ionalisa-
tion work even more than did its Conservat ive predecessor, since the
Labour governme nt was more committed to relieving the unemploy-
ment pro blem , yet had to deal with the conseq uences of the world
depress ion and was in a parliamentary minority; its senior ministers
were in any case mostly sceptical abo ut radical remedies and national-
isation , Snowden , particularly, told Norman in September 1929 th at he
'ent irely approved' the Bank's plan s for a subsidiary rationalisation
company (the Securi ties Management T rust), and 'would himself at all
times suppo rt it' ; for as he wrote six months later, he believed that by
rationalisation British industry could 'in substantial measure recapture
export trade'.6 5
Thomas, the minister with specia l responsibility for employment
policy, very ear ly on sought the Bank 's help in saving a major arma-
ments firm from liquidation;" whi le in late.1929, with unemployment
increasing, with his faith in public works programmes collapsing , and
with political criticism and his own demoralisation growing , he
appealed to Norman for more general assistance . In fact No rman
already had under considera tion a plan for · linking all the major City
banks in a new company to finance rationalisation, tho ugh he subse-
quently found it convenient to encourage ministers in the belief tha t
they had taken the initiative ; so he was happy to help T homa s recon-
struc t his policy, and recover his self-confidence." In January 1930
T homas read a statement prepared at the Bank announcing the City's
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readiness to receive rationalisation proposals, and also established con-
tact with the clearing bank chairmen." The formation of the Banke rs
Industr ial Development Company followed in April. However, this
fairly close liaison bet ween the City and the Labo ur government on
general industrial policy declined after T homas moved to the Domi n-
ions Office in [une," while rationalisation schemes proceeded slowly
and encountered difficulties within individual indu strie s. As a result ,
serious differences de veloped: Graham, President of the Board of
Trade, propo sed in January 1931 greater government involvement in
cotton rationalisation , and in Maya public utility company to take
cont rol of the iron and steel industry, both of which the Bank strongly
oppo sed . On the second occasion , Norman threatened to stop the work
of the SMT and BID Co, and claimed tha t an 'experiment' in socialism
would alarm foreigners and endanger the country's already delicate
financial position;"
The other major development during 1929 was the onset of the world
depression . The immediate effect ofthe Wall Street collapse in October
was relief on the foreign exchanges, allowing reductions of bank rate to
51% in November, and then by stages to 3% in May 1930. However, as
one source of difference between banking and politics receded , othe rs
came forward . On the causes of the interna tional collapse of prices,
ban kers themselves were divided . One very influent ial view was that
advanced particularly by Strakosch , and endorsed by the League of
Nations Gold Delegation: that the price collapse was chiefly a result of
maldistribution of monetary gold , caused by its accumulation and
's terilisation' by the USA and France; and that the remedy was inte rna -
tional co-operation to stabilise prices by persuading those count ries to
increase their foreign lending, and by obtaining economy in the use of
gold on the lines of the Genoa conference resolutions of 1922." Among
those who shared this emphasis on mone tary causes were Addis,
Blackett and Stamp among Bank of England directors, McKenna and
Leith-Ross, Deputy Cont roller of Finance at the Treasury." During
1930 the gold question was raised with increasing frequency by back-
bench MPs of all th ree partie s" and in December , with the issue now
'very muc h in the air', a group of Labour MPs formed a par liamentary
'Gold and Curre ncy Group' ." Maldistribution of gold was also men-
tioned in speeches by Graha m and Thomas, while MacDo nald declared
tha t the depression was due to ' a complete failure of the whole of the
mechanism of exchange. Catastrophe has come upon us from finance'. 75
Ministers were also interested in ideas for stabilising the price of silver,
which would im prove British trade in the East; in March 1931 the
Cabinet replied favourably to a Canadian-US proposal for a confer-
ence on silver, and MacDonald suggested that this should develop
into an international conference on 'general monetary and financial
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conditions';" Funhermore, during July a movement for bimetallism
began to eme rge - proposing the remonetisation of silver to compensate
for the shortage of monetary gold . It s chief advocates were Darling, a
director of the Midland Bank, Hunsdonof Anthony Gibbs & Sons, the
Liberal MP Lambert, and the Conservative politicians, Ame ry and
Horne; it was support ed by a group of seven other Conservative MPs,
and it aroused the interest of, amongst others, T homas, Beaverbrook ,
and Baldwin."
However, none of these developments amounted to rejections of the
international gold stan dard - only to a desire to improve or suppleme nt
it. Moreover, most bankers, while agreeing tha t ma ldistrib uti on of gold
was harmful , did not regard it as the main cau se of the pr ice collapse.
Brand , for example, thought tha t world overprod uction of com-
modities was at least as important a cause, Gooden ough and other
clearing bank chairmen that it was more so - and in their view produc-
tion could only be re-ad justed by market forces." At the Bank of
England , Norman and his advisers also attributed most of the blame to
overprod uction, and to misguided attempts to stabilise commodity
prices by stockpiling;"
Still , they did not deny that the gold question was important: in the
early 1920S No rman had tried to convene a central bank conference to
cons ider the Genoa reso lut ions, but vario us di stracti ons had prevented
thi s and he had soon discovered that other lead ing cent ral banks were
opposed to di scussions about gold 'scarcity' , whic h they regarded as
'essentially an English problem' . Although No rma n was 'e ntirely con-
tent ed ' with the Gold De legation's Interim Report , completed in June
1930 , it provoked considerable hostility abroad , particularly in the
USA and France; as both Keynes and Snowden observed , it was
considered to be 'the result of a British intrigue'.80 So it seemed that any
Bank of England proposal for an international conference on the gold
pro blem would fail, and would jeopardi se existing cent ral bank co-
operation . Nor did it seem that a British government ini tiat ive would
have any other result, and in any case the Bank was opposed to
government involvement in such matters. For all these reasons,
Norman and his advisers deprecated the view that the depression was
largely due to monetary causes, and th at monetary problems could be
allevia ted by any means other than discreet per sua sion through th e
Bank for International Settlements, T his attitude exasperated Leith-
Ross, but he acquiesced and took the Bank 's line because it was
accepted by Snowden; therefore the offic ial Treasury view towards
gold questions was that Britain could not act alone, that further reports
from the Gold Delegation were awaited , and that it was a mailer for the
central banks and the BIS." Since MacDonald and other ministers
were also advised by such 'monetary cause' advocates as Stamp and
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Keynes th at owing to foreign host ility it was 'ho peless ' to attempt
internationa l act ion, in the end they felt powerless to do anyth ing."
They were in anycase hindered by ignorance of currency problems; as
MacD onald told Norman in June 1931, ' it is a subject which I have
never studied and therefore know nothing abo ut ' ." For similar
reasons, the Bank's and Snowden 's views prevailed on the silver ques-
tion , which they regarded as a distraction from the main problem . In
May MacD onald told the American ambassador that an inte rna tional
conference on silver would be a 'mistake'.84
International monetary questions never developed int o a major
polit ical issue. City bankers did however become act ively involved in
the great political controver sy over trade policy during 1930. As the
world depression resulted in increased 'economic nationalism' abroad,
a shar p decline in Brit ish expo rts and int ensified competition from
forei gn imports , the balance of payments posit ion dete riorated and the
industr ial base for the City' s financial strength came under serio us
threat. Conseq uent ly, a growing number of financ iers reluctantly
abandoned free trade, and began to support economic consolidation of
the Empire and some form of protection . So, for example, Goodenough
became trea surer of Amery' s and Melchell 's Empire Economic Union
in December 1929, and by March 1930 McKenna was 'favourably
di sposed' towards Beaverbrook's Empi re Free Trade campaign." T his
shift in City opin ion became gene rally known with the pu blication in
July of a 'bankers' manifesto' declaring that the hopes of the 1926 plea
for economic freedom had been frustrated, and calling for 'urgent
measures for the promotion of inter-Imperial trade' . Among the sig-
natories were McKenna and the other chairmen ofthe 'big five' clearing
ba nks; Smith of Morgan, Grenfell & Co, May of the Prudential Insur-
ance Co , and Snagge of the Atlas Assura nce Co; Guinness of Stan dard
T ru st, the stockbroker Scott, and Jarvie, chairman of the Uni ted
Do minions Trust; Granet and Wagg, directors of BID Co, and two
Bank of England directors , Anderson and Whigham. Norman, how-
ever, made it clear that the manifesto did not originate in the Bank."
Private ly, Beaverbrook claimed to have instigated it through McKenna
and Whigham," and it cert ainly had the political impact he would have
intended , strengt hening the arguments of 'whole-hog' tariff reformers
withi n the Conservative party. Amery, for instance, wrote that the
manifesto 'means that Free Trade is practic ally dead ' , and immediately
used it to try and persuade Baldwin to repl ace the part y's pro posed
referendum on food duties wit h a 'free hand ' policy." Grey, Run ciman
and other prominent Liberals organised a free-trade repl y to the mani-
festo in September, but despite support from Add is, Bradbury, Bell
and Curr ie, it carried a much less impressive list of City name s." And
conversions to protect ion continued, including those of Grenfell ,
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Schuster , Holland-Martin, and Lewis of the National Provincial Bank
and the government's Economic Advisory Council." In January 1931
Norman himself was reported to have accepted that 'a tariff is inevit-
able'.91
These changes paralleled a transformation in prevailing indu str ial
opinion which the Federation of British Industries belatedly accepted
in Oct ober 1930. Before then, Whigham and Jarvie had assisted Sir
William Morri s in establishing a 'National Council of Indu stry and
Commerce', the aims of which included the adoption of protection and
imperial preference; Guinness, Scott , Snagge and Holland-Mamn
were other members , along with a large number of industrial ists." In
fact by late 1930 many financiers - whether or not they were members
of protectionist organisations - were part of a general movement in
business opinion which underlaid the Conservative party's adoptionof
a full imperial trade policy, the beginn ings of Simon' s Liberal protec-
tionist split , and indeed the conversion of MacDonald, Thomas and a
minority of Labour Cabinet ministers to import controls. The Cabinet
free trade majority was headed by Snowden; here, at least , the City was
politically at odds with the Chancellor of the Exchequer.
However, the area of greatest potential difficulty between the City
and the Labour government concerned industrial costs and budgetary
policy. Whatever their other explanations of Britain's industrial
troubles, all bankers - and industr ialists - agreed that levels of wages,
taxation and social service expenditure did nor assist business confi-
dence and internat ional competitiveness. Taxation and social service
expenditure seemed especia lly onerous because they were more within
the control of politicians, yet no governme nt had been able to resist
their increase. Bankers had complained of an 'excessive burden of
taxation'even while the Conservative government wasinoffice;" but in
late 1929, when the downturn in British export s and a prospect ive
budge t deficit seemed to demand financial restraint, the Labour
government increased expendit ure on pensions and unemployment
insurance . In the annual clearing bank meetings in Jan uary 1930,
several chairmen warned that the country 'could not afford' further
extensions of social services, whi le an advisory group of businessmen-
financier s organised by Thomas called for a 'new political note', includ -
ing a 'holiday from social legislation ' ." As the depression deepened and
industrial costs became heavier to bear, as revenues declined and
expenditure on unemployment insurance rose , bankers became still
more critical. By Octobe r another large deficit was expected, yet in
November borrowing for the Unemployment Insurance Fund was
increased and a supplementary estimate for transitional benefit was
needed . Bankers declared that taxation had become a 'crushing
burden', and there were now comp laints about the maintenance of
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'arbitrarily' high living standards." Accord ing to Holland-Martin, an
'un-thought-out wish to build Jeru salem . .. and to make a land fit for
heroes' had produced 'a standard of wages, pensions and unemploy-
ment pay totally above' the country's 'rea l means' ." It was widely
argued by bankers and industrialists that industrial recovery was
dependent upon action being taken against ' rigidity of wages' , and
especially against unemployment insurance 'abuses' and all other
'unproductive' public expenditure . A second objective of the National
Council of Industry and Commerce was to insist upon government
economy and 'a drastic reduction of taxation' , while in October Schus-
ter thought the financial position so serious that he suggested it might
need to be dealt with by the formation of a non-party, 'National'
government . Brand feared that in the absence of international action to
raise prices, 'there is really no alternative . . . to a direct attack on
costs' , and that if not done voluntari ly 'then ultimatel y economic forces
will . . . bring it about , possibly as a result of a really serious economic
and financial crisis'.91
This possibility seemed all the more threatening because during 1930
sterling had come under renewed pressure . Large French withdrawals
of gold from the Bank of England began in mid-M.ay.The Bank and the
Treasury still attributed such losses to external causes, part icularly to
what they regarded as 'defects' in the French monetary system," but
some financiers were already beginning to attribute the exchange weak-
nesses to domest ic condit ions. Lamont told MacDonald that govern-
rnenr policy was 'sending shiploads of British savings to the United
States' ; shortly afterwards his partner, Grenfell, gave a similar warning
to the House of Commons, and Stewart, an American eco nomic adviser
to Norman, told the Macmillan Committee in July that one reason for
Britain's gold shortage was the uncompetitiveness of its export indus-
tries." The losses were halted, artificially, in early June by the Bank's
inability to provide further 'fine' gold bars as demanded by the Bank of
Fra nce, and for several months the Bank of England actually increased
its gold reserves.'?' However, sterling remained weak on the major
foreign exchanges, while Sprague , Stewart's successor as American
adviser, told Norman in October that 'nothing very useful could be
done' about Britain's monetary position 'until there had been a general
deflation of wages and balancing of the budget' . '0' In early November ,
the exchanges fell to a point where it became profitable to refine the
Bank's 'standard' gold bars into 'fine' gold for export to France , and the
Bank's gold losses resumed, at a rate of £300,000 worth a day.':"
Norman obtained exchange support from the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York and the Bank of France, bur both of these now thought that
the weakness was partly due to doubts abour sterling itself. The
Americans were accordingly prepared to give only limited assistance, a
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decision which Sprague favoured because he th ought that otherwise
such support 'would foster the willingness of England to take her
difficulties sitt ing down , inst ead of standing against them' ." ? At t he
T reasury , Leith-Ross continued to attribute the gold losses largely to
conditions in Paris, and Snowden was persuaded to authorise discus-
sions with French T reasury officials in January 1931 to try and alleviate
the problems. Norman, howeve r, was cool towards these talks, as he
was in late 1930 towards Bank of France offers of a loan to ease the Bank
of England 's difficulties.!" In both cases, part of the reason seems to
have been that now he too believed that there were domestic causes of
the pou nd 's weakness, and that action should be taken at home.
In early 1931 there was a combination of sterling and bud getary
problems which in many respects foreshadowed the crisis of August.
Gold losses cont inued, sterling fell even in the forward exchange
markets, and there were clear signs of foreign loss of confidence in th e
pound . Snowden and the Treasury gave both Cabinet and public
warni ngs that the prospective bud get defici t and borrowing for unem-
ployment insurance were jeopardising British financial stability, and
the Cabinet discussed proposals for balancing the budget and cutt ing
the rates of unemployment insurance, but were una ble to reach agree-
ment. res The City as a whole was alarmed. In their ann ual speeches in
January, all the clearing bank chairmen except McKenna called for
'drast ic' govern ment economy measures. On the 27th Grenfell chaired
the inaugural meet ing of the 'Friends of Economy', a so-called 'non-
political' organisation comprising financiers, industrialists and leading
Liberal and Conservative politicians, and seeking the cessation of all
government expe nditure which was not 'absolutely necessary'; the
meeting was addressed by Grey and Horne, and the platform party
included Brand , Goodenough, Beaum ont Pease, Schuste r, and the
Bank of England directors, Addi s, Ki nde rsley, Ki tson and Peacock ."
As foreign opinions of sterling became known in London , the money
markets became extremely nervous. For examp le , on 5 February
ru mours that the Cabinet was about to adopt Lloyd George's plans for a
large deve lopment loan produced a sharp fall in government funds, and
Snowd en had to deny the rumour in the House of Commons. There was
even 'more or less open talk' that sterling might be forced off th e gold
standard, though no responsible person in the City proposed this
course - even M.cKenna wrote that 'those who advocated adevaluation
before we returned to the Gold Standard . . . are no longer in favour of
such action now that we have in fact returned'. 10 1 Confidence was
further weake ned by doubts about the willingness of politicians to face
th e prospect of un popular measures. As Brand wrote :
I am beginning to regard the situation as a dangerous one . . . and it doesn't
,
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seem 10 me that ourpoliti cal leaders have any idea of it. This is the reason why I
. . . am all for economy. . . . The trouble is that democracies seem unable
constitutionally to make Budgets balance. . . . In one country after another
drast ic economies can only be made by suspending the constitution, and I am
not at all sure that our time is not coming.''"
All of these fears were shared within the Bank of England. Sprague
spoke of the need for ' radical remed ies' to the T reasury in January and,
with No rman in atte nda nce, to the Macmillan Committee in Feb ruary.
He too stressed the political difficulties, telling the comm ittee that ' it is
a very real q uestion whether the necessary read justment will take place
in this count ry und er the democratic conditions that obtain' , though he
did propo se a 'national treaty' to couple cuts in wages and salaries with
increased taxation of rentier s.r" When a deputation of Manchester
businessmen suggested to Norman and his advisers in February that
the Bank could ease the economic position by expa nding the note issue,
the y were instead sent away with the idea of a campaign to 'Face the
Economic Truth s and act accordingly'. Clay, another of the Bank's
advisers, agreed with one of these businessmen that unless something
were done to correct the disequilibrium between prices and wages, the
count ry 'might well be in a ruinous position' within six months. He
suggested that the Ki ng be persuaded ' to announce th at in view of the
grave na tiona l emergency' he would ask Parliament for a 10% reduction
in the Civil List , which might embarrass Cabinet minis ters into taki ng a
similar cut in salary and so stimulate a 'general patriotic movement' of
voluntary reductions in income; in March he proposed another pro-
gramme similar to that of Sprague.". No rman' s own views probably
did not go as far as those of his adv isers; nevertheless he told T reasury
officials in February that ' the main troubles of this country were due to
the defects of our financial policy during the past few years and the
consequent lack of confidence in British Government securities and in
sterling'. I I I
Norman discussed the threat of a flight from sterling with Snowden
certainly in mid-january.P" and probably on other occasions. His
influence may be detected in the references to the exchange position in
the warni ngs of Snowden and the T reasury. However, these warnings
arose largely from an independent belief in the necessity for balanced
budge ts - as indeed did the alarm among opposition poli ticians. Any
advice given by Norman about monetary conditions merely confirmed
and reinforced Snowden's views; so, when Granet showed hima letter
from an American banker expressing doubts about ster ling , Nor man
seized upon it as 'exactly the ammunition I want for the Chancellor' .
Snowden himself welcomed the agitation from the City and elsewhere
forexpenditurecuts, and endorsed the view that drastic measures were
needed when he accepted the Liberal motion for a Committee on
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National Expenditure on I I February.1 13 However, the appointmentof
the May Committee postponed political discussion of emergency
budgetary action for the time being, while monetary pressures were
reduced by the eventu al success of market operations begun by the
Bank of England in late January, which halted the gold drain during
February.114
The pound neverthele ss remained weak; in early March Nor man was
afraid Britain might 'slide off the gold standard. II> With confide nce in
sterling at risk, the Bank was particularly worr ied about the character
of the forthcoming report of the Macmillan Committee. T he Com-
mittee of T reasury d iscussed the draft ing of the report with Lubbock ,
so that he might be better equ ipped to persuade his co-drafter s of the
'undesirability' of some of Keynes' s propo sals - apparently those on the
'objectives of monetary policy' which Lubbock himself thought so
half-hearted about the gold standard that he feared they might precipi-
tate a /light from sterling if included in the repo rt. no To the Bank and
the City generally, however, the maintenance of the gold standard
seemed to depend most upon govern ment policy; as Norman said , 't he
future here depends more on politics than on finance'. 1 17 The argu-
ments for radical remedies therefore cont inued to be stated, '" and
Norman himself sought to educate political opinion by agreeing to be
cross-examined on thr ee occasions by the Labour par liamenta ry
'Currency Group '. Each time he was accompanied by Sprague, who
again talked of the need for deflat ion and thereby added to his reputa-
tion as Norman'seminencegrise .119 Although Sprague was always care-
ful to say that he was expressing his own views, Norman did not
altogether repudiate them when MacD onald complained that
Sprague's statements were being interpreted as those of the Bank. 12 0
So well before the financial and political cr isis of August and Sep-
tember 1931 , it was believed at the Bank of England and elsewhere
in the City that the responsibility for the weakness of sterling lay in
British levels of income and especially in the governme nt' s financial
policy - and that since it was unthinkable that the gold standard should
be abandoned, it was highly desirable that these should be adjusted.
T he causes and stages of the crisis are familiar : the effects of the cent ral
European bank collapses, and of the publication of the Macmillan and
May Committee report s; the gold losses, the increases in bank rate, and
the American and Fren ch central bank credits to the Bank of England ;
the subsequent flight from sterling and the Bank's appea l to Labo ur
ministers; the ministerial deliberations on expe nditure cuts, and dis-
cussions with opposition leaders and the General Council of the TUC;
the efforts to obtain American and French cred its for the government ;
the Labour Cabinet split on 23 August, and the formation of an
all-party National government on the following day; the new Govern-
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meru's success in obtaining foreign credits, and its economy measures;
the attacks of the Labour opposition, the Invergordon naval mut iny,
the renewed flight from sterling, and the eventual abandonment of the
gold standard on 20 September.
During the first part of this crisis, the growing involvement of
bankers in political questions during the previous two years reached its
culminat ion, as the Bank of England, supported by other representa-
tive City bankers, attempted to fulfil its dut y under the gold standard of
ensuring that the Government took steps to preserve the nation's
credit. '" In late July Harvey - substituting for Norman', who was ill -
told MacDonald and Snowden that the central bank credits would
provide only temporary relief while the government form ulated its
budge tary plans, and a joint committee oft he British Bankers' Associa-
tion and the Accepting Houses Committee warned them of a serious
decline in foreign confidence in sterling and urged immedia te action to
cut expendit ure, balance the budget, and improve the trade balance.
When a clear flight from sterling developed in ear ly August, the joint
committee's letter was also signed by the chairmen of the chief clearing
banks - including even McKenna, for whom the crisis of confidence
had swept aside earlier doubts about the desirability of drastic budget-
ary measures. 12 2 T he Bank was now prepared to lose gold 'in order to
make the British government understand the seriousness of their posi-
tion') and Harvey advised Snowden that only immediate government
decisions on the budget problem could restore confidence. i aa Conse-
quently MacD onald broke his Scottish holiday and returned to
London, where it was impressed upon him and Snowden by Harvey
and Peacock that the solution lay ' in the hand s of the Government
alone'. 124 Bank directors nevertheless maintained their pressure upon
the ministers. T his was the effect , at least , of Harvey and Peacock
keeping them informed of the Bank 's techn ical position and later of its
communications with New York bank ers, and it was certainl y part of
their intention in bringing the leaders of the opposition part ies into the
discussions. Harvey and Peacock , being 'still in serious doubt as to
whether any action would be taken ' by the Government, asked for
minister ial permission to put ' the facts' before the Conservative and
Liberal leaders;'" only subsequently did MacDonald and Snowden
themselves arrange consultations with them. Harvey, Peacock and
Grenfe ll between them informed the Conservatives, Baldwin,
Chamberlain and Hoare, of the gravity of the exchange position;
Harvey, Kindersley, Peacock and Stamp impressed the same upon
Samuel , the acting Liberal leader, while his colleague Maclean was
briefed by three Bank directors, one of whom was the former Liberal
MP , Shaw. During the last days of the Labour government , Harvey
and Peacock talked with Chamberlain and Hoare almost asoften as they
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did with Mac Do nald and Snowden, and Shaw was freq uent ly in touch
with Samuel and Maclean . Bank di rectors also exp lained the situatio n
to other influ ential people: Dawson, edi tor of The Times, was seen by
Ki nder sley and later by Peacock, who as the Ki ng' s private financ ial
adviser was also in direct communication with the Palace.
Clearly , Bank of England direc tors were very busy making their
views known to tho se who mattered and , indeed , delibe ratel y pre -
cipitated government action on the budget. Their att itude was bluntly
stated by Norma n, before he left to convalesce abroad in mid -Augu st :
the country would pull through 'if we can get them (the Government)
frightened enough' .!" However, this pressure was not interpreted as
dictationbythe politiciansinvolved, in so faras none of them - noteven
theeventualdissentient Labourministers - rejected the bankers' analy-
sis of the exchange position , or doubted tha t the gold standard should
be defended; nor d id they question the need for a balanced budget. The
subseq uent controversy about ' bankers' dictation' concern ed rather the
man ner of balancing the budget , specifically the issue ofcuts in the rate
of unemployment insura nce payments. Over the role of the Bank
directors and New York bankers in this matter therewas some genuine
misunderstanding , as well as wilful distort ion by resigning Labour
mi nisters. While the banker s recommended in the strongest terms that
the budget should be balanced , on the means ofdo ing so they observed
at least the principle of political non-interventio n, and did not attempt
to impose specific measures. Harvey, true to his evidence before the
Macmillan Committee, wrote in his original warning letter to Snowden
that he was 'most anxious not to step beyond [hi s] province' . In the first
meet ings with mini sters and opposition leaders Peacock did offer some
suggestions about taxation and economies - apparent ly witho ut dir ect
reference to unemployment insurance ':" - but these were plainly
regarded as personal comments, not as instr uctions from the Bank. In
fact, as Bank directors knew, the y did not need to insist up on particular
. economies, owing to the background of discussion about expenditure
cuts culminat ing in the May repor t proposals for con siderable savings
on unemployment insurance. The real pressure for cuts in unemploy-
ment benefits during August originated from Snowden and MacDonald
within the Cabinet , from the Treasury, and especially from the opposi-
tion leaders. The Bank di rectors' role was essentially as Harvey had
de scribed to the Macmillan Committee - ad vising on the financial
effects of particular political operations, though wit h the difference that
they were now advising opposition leaders as well as ministers. Their
advice was, of course, that the cuts proposed by Snowden, MacDonald
and the opposition leaders would have a most beneficial effect upon
financial confidence: when these views were reiterated in emphatic
terms by two ministers desperately striving for Cabinet agreement, it
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coul d indee d have been seen as an attempt at dicta tion. As for Governo r
Harrison and the Morgan partners in New York, their initia l advice on
the feasibi lity of a govern ment loan simply reinforced that already given
by the Bank of Engla nd about the need for a balanced budget. Later,
when MacDonald asked for their opinion on his own budget scheme,
which included a cut in une mployment payments, they did not feel
competent to judge its adequacy, and yet were embarrassed by the
kn owledge that an unhelpful answer might cause the government to
resign . So they tried to compromise, by expressing willingness to help
but also asking if the proposed scheme would be support ed by the Bank
and the City generally ." . The notorious cable which supposedly caused
the Labour Cabinet to resign on 23 August was therefore a repl y 10
proposals made by the Prime Minister, and the crucial sentence was a
statement not of conditions but of enquiry - in other words, therewas
no attempt in New York to dictate specific economies. MacDonald's
scheme was in fact acceptable to the Bank and to other leading City
bankers,iss but not to a minority of min isters who had already resolved
10 reject the cut in une mployment payments whatever the reply from
New York , and their opposition was sufficient to bring down the
government .
T he invo lvement of Bank directors in politics did not cease with the
end of the La bour governmen t; indeed for a time they had even great er
influence, since their advice was vital for a National government
formed spec ifically 10 overco me the sterl ing crisis. A sudden accelera-
tion of the fligh t from the pound on 24 August, caused by The Times
revealing that the earlier bank credits were nearly exhausted,13 0 meant
that MacDonald , Snowden and their new Conservative and Liberal
colleagues spent a few days under cons iderable pressu re from Harvey
and Peacock to issue definite statements of the government's composi-
tion and intentions, and to hasten the negotiations for government
credits with Frenchand American bankers." ?Declarations ofthe new
Government 's determination 10 balance the budget and cut expendi-
tu re , followed by the anno uncement of the credits on 29 August,
restored some financia l confide nce and abated withdrawals of capitai
from London . But the excha nge position remained delicate and , conse -
q uen tly , Bank directors found themselves asked to arbitrate in
ministerial di scussions. When Chamberlain, Samuel and Loth ian the
Liberal under-secretary for India , approached them on the 27th with
the latter's scheme for a capital levy - intended to ensure that the
budget did not appear 10 discriminate against the working class _
Harvey and other directors were 'much attracted by the polit ical advan-
tages' but deprecated the plan because the y feared it would ' immedi-
ately induce a flight from the pound and also be taken by the [Socialists]
as a pre cedent to be repeated' . '" In mid -September, when the drain of
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fund s had resumed despite the anno uncement of the budget and the
economy bill, Harvey also warned of the dangers to confidence in
arg uing against a prohibition on Briti sh capital exports proposed by
Reading, the Liberal Foreign Secreta ry, but opposed by Snowden and
the Trea sury. 13 3 By then, however , the chief question on which their
advice was sought was the actua l future of the Government.
The Bank directors' views on this issue were considered important
because the attitude of the Labour opposition and their TUC allies,
together with fears that they might win an earl y genera l election , were
thought to be affecting confidence in sterling. Peacock saw Citrine , the
TUC general secretary, on 24 August in an effort to convi nce him of the
seriousness of the exchange posit ion , and of the Bank 's innocence of
any attempt to influence the Labour Cabinet's policy.' '' Despite this,
the TUC General Council joined Labour ex-ministers in accusations
that the prev ious cabinet had been destroyed by a 'bankers' ramp', and
in violent attacks upon the National government and its proposed cuts
in social services and public empl oyees' wages - eve n those reductions
that the former min isters had earlier been prepared to accept. Although
there was no explicit opposition to the gold standard, these declarations
were still disturbing to foreign financialopinion since Labo ur remained
the largest single parliamentary party, the new ministers had expressly
for med an emergenc y government for only a short period , and there
was considerable doub t about how the electo rate would react to the
expenditu re cuts. T he pressure for a general election arose chiefly
beca use many Conservatives wanted a mandate to introduce tariffs;
opinions differed over whether the part y should fight independe ntly, or
in alliance with other gro ups. Liberal min ister s were opposed to tariffs
and wished the National government to continue with out an election,
whil e MacDonald wanted tariffs but was torn over the election qu es-
tion . As the de teriorating balance of trade was now contributing to the
weakness of sterling, most Bank director s as well as other City finan-
ciers wanted urgent consideration of tari ffs - and Peacock inform ed
senior min isters of this in mid- September. But all Bank di rectors - their
own views reinforced by opinions from New York - believed that just
the talk of a genera l election was weakening confide nce, while actually
to hold an election on the old three-part y lines would have a disastrous
effect , and even one fought by a Na tiona l government alliance would
inflict considerable damage. T hey wanted the National govern ment to
stay in office and deal with the trade balance without bothering about
its mandate. These views, elicited from Harvey and Peacock at Cabinet
and Cabinet Committee meetings, and pressed by more d irectors upon
Conservative ministers and back-b enchers on other occ asions, were a
major consideration in all poli tical discussions about an election.' :"
However, during this second part of the crisis, from the end of
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Aug ust , the influence of the Bank of England in fact began to decl ine.
One reason for this was that as the second American and French credits
were specifically for the government, the Cabinet and the Treasury had
a direct responsibility within the Bank's special field. Anot her was that
with the maintenance of the gold standard now a central political
problem and with reputations at stake, ministers could not afford to
leave exchange qu estions as mat ters to be discussed solely at the Bank.
The very fact that Harvey and Peacock were summoned before a
Cabi net meeting and sessions of the Cabinet Fin ancial Situation Com-
mittee , was a significant change . Although ministers were primarily
seeking advice , the directors were neverthele ss being required to
expla in the Bank 's calculations; while some mini sters and Treasury
officials were rapidly developing their own views on the Bank's con-
cerns , and offering suggestions . Moreover, Conservatives were so
determined to have a tar iff election that they refused to be intimi dated
by the Bank 's ad vice. T hey did not rep udia te the gold standard , but
argued that only if the political uncert aint y was ended by an election
would the weakness of sterling be o vercome .136 In mid- September even
the Bank's warnings that the remaining gover nme nt credits could not
last through an election did not deter them , and the directors had to
reconcile themselves to the inevitable Cabinet decision. Before it was
taken , however, the effects of the Invergordon incident were felt, and
the pressure upon sterling seemed irres istible.
In this final crisis of the gold standard , the Bank of England exercised
its trad itional inde pendence for the last time . On 18 September, it
decided that the position was hopeless, and allowed the exchange rate to
fall and gold to stream out of the Bank: only subsequently were
MacDonald and other minister s informed , ':" even though this decision
vitally affected their government. Bank dire ctors had earlier been
urg ed by senior ministers to seek further assistance from New York and
Paris, but they now deprecated offers of help and advice from these
quarters.':" However, the Nat iona l government met the embarrass-
ment of going off gold mid- way through the passage of its economy
measures by claiming that a balanced budget would prevent even worse
disasters; it the reby survived the ordeal and went on to win the general
election. For the Bank of England, the abandonment of the gold
standard was the end of its exclusive authority in monetary policy. T he
decisions on whether to return to gold, or how to manage the sterling
exchange if this were not done , were now a matter for the Government ,
and T reasury officials were soon busily discussing these issues. ':" As
there was, in fact , to be no return to the gold standard , the establish-
ment of the Exchange Equalisation Account and the int roduct ion of
cheap money in 1932 marked the beginning of a new part nership
between the Bank of Engl and and the public authori ties - though
natio nalisation was not to come for another fourteen years.
